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Abstract. Here we investigate what it might mean for a formulation of quan-
tum mechanics to be empirically adequate. We begin by considering the mea-
surement problem as an empirical problem and distinguishing between stronger
and weaker varieties of empirical adequacy. A strongly adequate theory is one
that provides a compelling explanation of the experiences of a physically sit-
uated observer. A formulation of quantum mechanics that provides such sit-
uated empirical adequacy also provides a particularly compelling response to
the measurement problem. As a concrete example we consider how Bohmian
mechanics explains the experience of a physically situated observer.
1. the measurement problem and situated observation
Bohmian mechanics was proposed as a solution of the quantum measurement
problem. To solve the problem, it must provide an appropriately compelling account
of our quantum experience. As we will see, Bohmian mechanics provides an account
that is both richer and more subtle than just describing the behavior of a directly-
observable primitive ontology. Rather, it allows one to explain the experience of a
physically situated observer, an observer who might herself be characterized within
the theory. Part of the present argument is that this strong sort of empirical
adequacy is precisely what one should want from a satisfactory solution to the
quantum measurement problem.1
The goal is not to give canonically necessary and sufficient conditions for a
satisfactory solution to the quantum measurement problem. Rather, the thought
is that opting for a solution to the measurement problem involves choosing how to
best explain quantum experience and a theory that allows one to account for the
experience of a physically situated observer provides a particularly compelling sort
of explanation.
At root, the quantum measurement problem is a problem in accounting for de-
terminate measurement records that would explain our experience. The problem
itself is a direct consequence of how physical states are represented in quantum
mechanics and the linearity of the standard quantum dynamics. On the standard
linear dynamics, the unit-length vector |ψ(t0)〉S representing the state of a physical
system S at an initial time t0 evolves as follows:
|ψ(t1)〉S = Û(t0, t1)|ψ(t0)〉S
Date: August 7, 2021.
1Salient to the present discussion, I take this way of thinking about the measurement problem
to be very much in the tradition of both David Bohm (1951, 583) and Hugh Everett III (1956,
118–9) and (1957, 183–5)
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where Û(t0, t1) is a unitary operator that depends on the energy properties of the
system. The problem can be seen by considering an ideal x-spin measurement.2
Suppose an object system S begins in the superposition of x-spin states repre-
sented by
α|↑x〉S + β|↓x〉S
and that an observer F and her measuring device M begin ready to make an x-spin
measurement of S. The composite system, then, begins in the state:
|“r”〉F |“r”〉M (α|↑x〉S + β|↓x〉S).
Suppose that M is a perfect measurement device and F a perfect observer. That is,
suppose that M ’s pointer reading becomes perfectly correlated with the x-spin of S
so that |“r”〉M | ↑x〉S would evolve to |“↑x”〉M | ↑x〉S and |“r”〉M | ↓x〉S would evolve
to |“↓x”〉M | ↓x〉S when M interacts with S. And suppose that F ’s measurement
record becomes perfectly correlated with M ’s pointer so that |“r”〉F |“↑x”〉M | ↑x〉S
would evolve to |“↑x”〉F |“↑x”〉M | ↑x〉S and |“r”〉F |“↓x”〉M | ↓x〉S would evolve to






Figure 1. The measurement problem setup
Assuming such perfect correlating interactions, since the quantum dynamics is
linear, the resultant state of the composite system will be:
α|“↑x”〉F |“↑x”〉M |↑x〉S + β|“↓x”〉F |“↓x”〉M |↓x〉S .
The problem is that this state does not describe any particular determinate mea-
surement record and hence does not explain there being a single determinate post-
measurement observer record.
The measurement problem is an empirical problem. The linear dynamics does
not explain how a situated observer, an observer as characterized within the theory
itself, ends up with a determinate measurement record with the standard quantum
probabilities. Inasmuch as the theory fails to make the standard quantum predic-
tions for a situated observer it fails to be empirically adequate. We will reflect
further on this way of thinking of empirical adequacy throughout the paper.3
2The following is, in brief, how both Hugh Everett (1956) and (1957) and Eugene Wigner (1961)
set up the measurement problem.
3The thought that the quantum measurement problem ultimately involves providing a satisfactory
explanation of the experience of a situated observer meshes well with a number of salient historical
discussions. Of particular note, Hugh Everett understood the measurement problem as resulting
from a failure to consider carefully what an observer would experience when treated as a physical
system herself. Everett’s strategy was to show that there was a concrete sense in which pure wave
mechanics could be taken to make the right empirical predictions for an observer as characterized
within the theory. This approach led to his relative-state formulation of pure wave mechanics
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There are at least three ways to address the measurement problem.4 The first
is to deny that the state predicted by the linear dynamics is the state that in fact
results from such a chain of interactions. The standard collapse theory does this
by postulating that whenever a measurement is made, the system S randomly, in-
stantaneously, and nonlinearly jumps to an eigenstate of the observable being mea-
sured and stipulating that the probability of jumping to |φ〉S when O is measured
is |〈ψ|φ〉|2. Then if one supposes that a measurement occurs at some point in the
chain of interactions, one ends up with the composite state |“↑x”〉F |“↑x”〉M | ↑x〉S
and hence a record of x-spin up with probability |α|2 or the composite state
|“↓x”〉F |“↓x”〉M |↓x〉S and hence a record of x-spin down with probability |β|2. This
is also the basic strategy used by other collapse theories like GRW. Such theories
seek to describe precisely when and how such collapses occur.5
A second way to address the problem is to insist that both physically possible
x-spin records are in fact fully realized. This strategy, however, leads to two new
problems. One must now explain why it appears to a post-measurement observer
that she got precisely one of the physically possible determinate measurement re-
sults when the final state represents her as in some sense getting both results. And
one must explain why the probability of getting the result x-spin up is |α|2 and why
the probability of getting the result x-spin down is |β|2 when both results are fully
represented in the final state. Many worlds formulations of quantum mechanics
seek to address the first of these, the determinate-record problem, by insisting that
the measurement interaction results in two observers, one of whom gets each of the
two possible measurement results. At first thought, this serves to make the second
problem all the more puzzling as now the usual forward-looking probability of x-
spin up and the usual forward-looking probability of x-spin down are each simply
one. While we will discuss briefly a contrast between how Bohmian mechanics and
Everettian quantum mechanics explain experience later, there is much more to say
about the determinate record and probability problems.6
A third way to address the measurement problem is to take the quantum-
mechanical state predicted by the linear dynamics to be right but then to add
something to the theory that chooses one or the other of the two possible outcomes
as the single measurement record that is in fact realized by the measurement inter-
action. This is the hidden-variable strategy. The hidden variable in a theory like
Bohmian mechanics can be thought of as a sort of ontological marker that selects
one branch of the quantum-mechanical state as the one that is in fact realized.
Our concern here is with how hidden-variable theories like Bohmian mechanics
explain the experience of a situated observer and hence manage to be empirically
and the various many-worlds theories. See Barrett (2015) and (2020) chapter 9 for discussions of
this approach and how it was to work. Jenann Ismael (2007) and (2016) has put the notion of a
situated observer to philosophical work on issues like the nature of freewill. Here we are just using
it to get clear on the more modest question of how one might think of the explanatory demands of
empirical adequacy. As discussed in the next section, the notion of a situated observer is something
that routinely arises, at least implicitly, in philosophical discussions of empirical adequacy.
4This way of thinking of the measurement problem is discussed, among other places, in Everett
(1956), Albert (1992), Maudlin (1995), and Barrett (1995).
5See Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber (1986) for a description of GRW and Barrett (2020) chapter 8
for a discussion of the virtues and vices of alternative formulations of the theory.
6See Everett (1956) and (1957) for his original relative-state proposal and Saunders, Barrett,
Kent, and Wallace (eds) (2010), Wallace (2012) and Barrett (2018) and (2020) for a start on
recent discussions of how one might make sense of it.
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adequate. The basic strategy is to find something to make determinate that, given
the theory’s auxiliary dynamics, provides something on which the content of one’s
determinate measurement records might plausibly supervene.7 Importantly, the
something on which one’s records might be taken to supervene may be different
from the something determinate that was added to the theory to complement the
usual quantum-mechanical state. Indeed, as we will see, this is the case for Bohmian
mechanics.
We consider in some detail how Bohmian mechanics accounts for a situated
observer’s experience. This will involve getting clear on what a determinate mea-
surement record is and how it acquires its empirical content in the theory. We will
see that how the theory explains the experience of a situated observer is signifi-
cantly less direct and hence more subtle than one might have thought. Ultimately,
this makes the question of the variety of empirical adequacy exhibited by Bohmian
mechanics a delicate matter.
We will begin by considering a number of different ways to understand what it
might be for a physical theory to be empirically adequate. The strongest of these
will require a theory to explain the experience of a situated observer, an observer
whose measurement records are modeled within the theory. Finally, we will consider
the sort of empirical adequacy exhibited by Bohmian mechanics.
2. varieties of empirical adequacy
Among other things empirical science aims to provide empirically adequate the-
ories.8 That said, there are a number of ways of understanding what it might
mean for a theory to be empirically adequate. The basic idea is that an empirically
adequate theory explains our experience. Put another way, we consider a theory
to be empirically adequate if it tells us that observers will experience just what
they do in fact experience. But how one unpacks this basic idea depends on what
one requires of a satisfactory account of an observer’s experience for the task at
hand. Some ways of accounting for an observer’s experience are richer and more
compelling than others. The thought is to associate different notions of empirical
adequacy with different sorts of explanatory demands.
One might begin by imagining a spectrum ranging from more impoverished to
richer varieties of empirical adequacy. In many cases, just being able to formulate
an accurate predictive algorithm may be a notable achievement. But a theory that
does just this provides only a threadbare variety of empirical adequacy. Consider,
in contrast, a theory that provides a dynamical account for how measurement inter-
actions produce physical records on which a situated observer’s experience might
plausibly be taken to supervene. Such an account, if one can get it, would clearly
exhibit a richer and more compelling variety of empirical adequacy. The thought
behind such situated empirical adequacy is that a theory only really makes the right
empirical predictions, and is hence empirically adequate, if it makes the right em-
pirical predictions for a situated observer, an observer whose measurement records
7Note, in contrast, that this is not a problem for the collapse strategy. On that approach, a
measurement-like interaction causes a collapse that puts the composite system in, or near, a
particular record eigenstate. As a consequence, one might take one’s determinate measurement
record to supervene on the quantum-mechanical state itself.
8Some take this to be the chief or even only aim of science. As Bas van Fraassen put it, “Science
aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as
belief only that it is empirically adequate” (1980, 12).
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are modeled and correctly predicted by the theory. One would expect a theory like
that also to explain why the world looks the way it does. While it would clearly
be great to have, one might worry that such a theory is doubly difficult to formu-
late as it is ultimately answerable both to what we experience and to our beliefs
and commitments concerning how our experience supervenes on physical records
in the world described by the theory. For the purposes of addressing the measure-
ment problem, however, even just an approximate, plausible account of situated
experience might serve as a model to get us started.
In this spirit, we will distinguish between three rough-hewn varieties of empirical
adequacy a physical theory like quantum mechanics might exhibit. One might take
a theory to be minimally adequate over a domain of phenomena if it provides an
algorithm for making accurate empirical predictions in that domain. Such a theory
need not even purport to describe the physical world or characterize the sequence
of events that produce the phenomena we experience. Alternatively, one might
take a theory to be weakly adequate if it makes accurate empirical predictions
and provides something on which one’s experience might in principle be taken to
supervene. Such a theory might make the right predictions and seek to explain why
one experiences what one does, it is just that the explanation it gives is judged to be
ad hoc, implausible, or otherwise uncompelling. Finally, one might take a theory to
be more strongly adequate insofar as it allows one to provide a dynamical account
of something on which one’s experience might plausibly be taken to supervene
given our background beliefs and commitments concerning what physical facts are
relevant to the values of our experience. The question here is the extent to which the
theory provides a context for one to give a plausible account of a situated observer’s
records. The theory itself need not provide a full account of the relationship between
her physical and experiential states. It just needs to provide a set of determinate
facts sufficient to allow one to account, at least schematically, for her experience.
It does so if it explains how she ends up with the records she does.
Inasmuch as it might be taken to be descriptive of the physical world, a weakly
adequate theory is arguably something more than just a predictive algorithm, but
it might not be much more. In contrast, a strongly adequate theory provides a
context for explaining why the world looks the way it does to a situated observer,
with something like the properties we take ourselves to have, inhabiting the world
described by the theory. One should expect judgments of strong adequacy to be
informed by our beliefs and commitments regarding how experience in fact super-
venes on the physical world, and these, in turn, to depend ultimately on our best
understanding of our perceptual and cognitive faculties. Both weak and strong ad-
equacy provide higher-octane explanations than minimal adequacy. They are only
possible in theories expressive enough to characterize a situated observer and to
provide an account for how such an observer ends up with the records she does.
W. V. O. Quine (1969) famously argued that an appropriately sophisticated
empiricist should treat experience itself as a thoroughly natural phenomenon. The
sort of situated empirical adequacy we are discussing here might be thought of as
a variety of naturalized empirical adequacy. One’s physical theory only provides a
naturalistic account of an observer’s experience if it explains her records as aspects
of the world described by the theory.
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Situated empirical adequacy also fits well with something like constructive em-
piricism. Bas van Fraassen takes a theory to be empirically adequate if the struc-
tures described in one’s observational reports are isomorphic to the observable
substructures of a model of the theory (1980, 64). He then appeals to what the
theory predicts would in fact be observable to a situated observer, to an observer
as characterized by the theory itself, to say what it means for a substructure of a
theory’s model to be observable (1980, 16 and 56–59).
Judgments regarding situated empirical adequacy involve seeking a reflective
equilibrium between two explanatory demands. We want our physical theories to
be empirically adequate, and hence, to explain why we see what we do. But we
also rely on our best physical theories to explain what it is that we are in fact
seeing when we experience the world. One might imagine tuning each direction of
explanation as we consider increasingly sophisticated and compelling theories.
Inasmuch as a theory arguably fails to make any empirical predictions whatsoever
unless it makes predictions for the records of a situated observer, strong adequacy
is clearly an empirical virtue we should want whenever we can get it. Concerning
the quantum measurement problem in particular, seems to me that one only has a
truly compelling resolution if one can give a plausible account of the measurement
records of a physically situated observer.
Some formulations of quantum mechanics provide more or less successful pre-
dictive algorithms but are not rich enough to count as even weakly adequate as
they do not even begin to explain how a situated observer might end up with the
records she does. It is characteristic of information-theoretic formulations of quan-
tum mechanics that the quantum-mechanical state is understood as representing an
agent’s epistemic or informational state not the state of the physical world.9 Inas-
much as such theories do not even purport to describe how determinate measure-
ment records might be produced on which a situated observer’s experience might
be taken to supervene, they lack the sort of descriptive and explanatory ambition
of even something like the single-mind theory, which we will discuss in the next
section. While implausible on the face of it, something like the single-mind theory
allows one to characterize what measurement records are and how records of the
sort we find may be produced by interactions between an observer and the systems
she observes and is, hence, weakly adequate. That we have formulations of quantum
mechanics that are weakly adequate is part of what renders information-theoretic
formulations of quantum mechanics unattractive.10
A proponent of the information-theoretic approach might argue in reply that it is
better to opt for just a predictive algorithm, and hence only a minimally adequate
formulation of quantum mechanics, than to endorse a weakly adequate theory. In
the former case, one is in suspense concerning the nature of the quantum world
while, in the latter, one commits to an implausible account of experience. But one
need not commit to a theory’s metaphysics to use the theory. Even a theory that
appeals to an implausible metaphysics may be useful in guiding one’s application
of quantum mechanics for predictive purposes. While clearly not the case with the
9See Fuchs (2010), Healey (2012), and Bub (2015) for diverse examples of the information-theoretic
tradition. See Barrett (2020, 187–9) and Hagar and Hemmo (2006) for explanations of some of
the limitations of information-theoretic formulations of quantum mechanics as even just predictive
algorithms.
10See Barrett (2020, 187–9) for further discussion.
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book theory of the next section, the single-mind theory serves well as a heuristic
for understanding subtle no-collapse experiments.
Before considering that, this is a good place consider something closely related
to the notion of situated empirical adequacy. The notion of empirical incoherence
also involves considering a situated observer. A descriptive theory is empirically
incoherent if a situated observer could have no empirical evidence for accepting the
theory if the theory were in fact true. If an empirically incoherent theory were true,
the nature of the physical world the situated observer inhabits would prevent her
from having reliable evidence in favor of the theory. Remarkably, there are a number
of formulations of quantum mechanics that are empirically incoherent. There is
hence a transcendental argument for not accepting an empirically incoherent theory.
If it were true, empirical inquiry would be impossible. This issue is perhaps most
salient in the Everett no-collapse tradition.11
3. the ways of weak adequacy
Here we will briefly discuss two weakly adequate theories. The first is fanciful.
The second is more useful but perhaps ultimately no more plausible.
Consider an omniscient god who imagines creating the universe we take our-
selves to inhabit but then decides not to do it. Being omniscient, she knows what
each agent would have experienced had she decided to create the universe we take
ourselves to inhabit, so she decides to create a radically different sort of universe
instead. The universe she creates contains just one object, a book that records
in full detail every experience each agent would have had if the universe we take
ourselves to inhabit had in fact been created. Suppose that theory T fully and
accurately describes this book universe.
By construction, theory T describes something on which one’s experience might
be taken to supervene—namely, an agent might take the intricately detailed descrip-
tions in the book to ground her experience. In this sense T is weakly adequate. But
inasmuch as we find it highly implausible that our experience supervenes on the
sort of physical records described by T , we cannot take T to be strongly adequate.
More specifically, among other beliefs and commitments, we take our experience to
supervene on more or less reliable physical brain records produced by interactions
between us and the physical systems we observe. So while T provides something
on which one’s quantum experience might be taken to supervene, it is not a plau-
sible something. Indeed, given such beliefs and commitments, T might as well just
be a minimal predictive algorithm as it fails completely in providing a compelling
narrative for why we experience what we do.
While one should be willing to entertain nonstandard, perhaps strikingly counter-
intuitive, accounts of experience, it is not the case that anything goes, particularly
11See Barrett (1996) and (1999, 116–7 and 189) for discussions of empirical incoherence in the
context of pure wave mechanics (the bare theory) and other no-collapse theories (like the single-
and many-minds theories). In brief, if the bare theory were true, a situated observer could have no
empirical evidence that it was. Similar considerations apply to situated observers in some many-
worlds formulations regarding evidence of forward-looking quantum probabilities. See Barrett
(2020) for a discussion. Along similar lines, Huggett and Wüthrich (2013) consider the empirical
coherence of quantum theories of spacetime. Putting their point in the language we are using
here, it is unclear how one might even make sense of a situated observer making observations in
theories of quantum gravity that postulate spacetime as an emergent structure.
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if one has other theoretical options that better satisfy our shared explanatory de-
mands. But that said, clearly not all of our explanatory demands are fully shared.
In the context of deciding between alternative formulations of quantum mechan-
ics, competing arguments are often grounded in conflicting commitments regarding
what one ought to care about most in one’s physical theories. Lacking a canon-
ical way of answering such questions, we formulate options that are as attractive
as we can make them, then aim to decide on cost-benefit grounds how we might
best satisfy our background explanatory commitments. While there is no reason
to suppose that such reflections will lead to consensus on a single clear winner in
every case, we sometimes find common ground. One should expect wide agreement
that the book theory T is unattractive in spite of its stipulated empirical virtues.
The book theory T is minimally adequate because it provides an algorithm for
predicting what one will experience (just look at what T says of the book). It is also
weakly adequate, because there is something in the world on which one might take
ones experience to supervene (the descriptive expressions in the book). But it is not
strongly adequate because our best accounts of perception and cognition suggest
that one experience supervenes on something like particle positions and/or field
configurations in brains, not descriptive expressions in a book. A failure of strong
adequacy is a failure in compatibility with our background commitments regarding
the sort of physical facts one needs to explain the experience of a situated observer.
In the book theory it is difficult even to make plausible sense of a situated observer.
David Albert and Barry Loewer’s (1988) single-mind formulation of quantum
mechanics is another example of how a theory might make the right empirical
predictions yet give an implausible account of experience. The single-mind theory
is significantly richer than the book-universe theory, though perhaps ultimately not
that much more plausible. But significantly, its dynamical account of experience
makes it more than just a predictive algorithm.
On the single-mind formulation of quantum mechanics, every physical observer
is associated with a nonphysical mind that possesses an always-determinate mental
state. When a physical observer performs a measurement and ends up with a
superposition of different physical brain records, the observer’s mind randomly
becomes associated with precisely one of the branches with probabilities determined
by the norm-squared of the amplitude of each branch. The observer’s mind then
directly experiences the associated branch state. In the post-measurement state
α|“↑x”〉F |“↑x”〉M |↑x〉S + β|“↓x”〉F |“↓x”〉M |↓x〉S .
This means that F ’s mind ends up associated with the first branch and hence the
experience of seeing M ’s pointer pointing at the result “↑x” with probability |α|2,
and F ’s mind ends up associated with the second branch and hence the experience
of seeing M ’s pointer pointing at the result “↓x” with probability |β|2. The single-
mind theory is a sort of hidden-variable theory, one where the observer’s mind
selects a branch of the standard quantum-mechanical state and the selected branch
determines the experiential state of the observer’s mind.
One must specify somewhat more than this to get a complete mental dynamics
for the theory, but it should be clear that one can do so in a way that predicts the
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standard quantum probabilities.12 The resulting theory is consequently empirically
adequate over the quantum experiments we have performed so far. Further, the
single-mind theory provides something on which an observer’s experience might be
taken to supervene. Here it is something that one might take to directly determine
her experience—the state of her nonphysical mind.
That said, the very effectiveness of its explanation of experience reveals how
ad hoc the single-mind theory is. Indeed, rather than seeking to provide a com-
pelling dynamical account of how reliable measurement records on which a situated
observer’s experience might plausibly be taken to supervene are produced by mea-
surement interactions, here one simply stipulates the right quantum experience for
the observer directly. The theory does little to explain why one experiences what
one does, and in this it is very like a minimally adequate predictive algorithm. In-
deed, take any purely predictive theory, then just postulate the existence of a mind
that has precisely those predicted experiences and one has explanations that are in
many ways akin to those of the single-mind theory.
Given its implausible narrative and the metaphysical assumptions on which it
depends, one might take the single-mind theory’s account of quantum experience
to be no more compelling than the book-universe account. On the book-universe
theory, the physical system on which my mental state would have to supervene,
the static ink marks on the pages of a book in a static world, is not the sort
of physical system that we in fact take to provide an acceptable explanation of
experience. On the single-mind theory, there is nothing whatsoever physical on
which my experience might be taken to supervene, also contrary to our firmly held
beliefs and commitments. Both theories provide something on which my experience
might be taken to supervene, but in neither case it is a compelling something
given our background commitments. Hence, in neither case is the theory strongly
adequate.
But these negative comparisons ignore the single-mind theory’s heuristic virtues.
While its description of the world is implausible, the theory is significantly more
than a minimal predictive algorithm. Since physical states always evolve in a linear
way and since mental states do nothing to affect the evolution of physical states,
the single-mind theory provides a useful framework for thinking through the empir-
ical predictions of no-collapse formulations of quantum mechanics generally. Such
a framework is particularly welcome when analyzing counterintuitive measurement
interactions like those involved in Wigner’s friend self-measurements.13 Signifi-
cantly, it is precisely this sort of predictive problem that minimal information-
theoretic formulations of quantum mechanics often muddle.14 This is one way in
which a theory that is only weakly adequate may be more useful than a minimally
adequate predictive algorithm that seeks to be agnostic about physical states and
processes.
12One must, for example, say what happens when one repeats a measurement or another observer
performs the same measurement. See Albert and Loewer (1988), Albert (1992), and Barrett (1999)
for discussions of the single-mind theory and its dynamics.
13See Albert (1986) and (1992) chapter 8 and for descriptions of such experiments.
14See Hagar and Hemmo (2006) and Barrett (2020, 187–9) for discussions of the predictive inade-
quacies of information-theoretic formulations, inadequacies not shared by the single-mind formu-
lation.
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4. strong adequacy and the notion of primitive ontology
A weakly adequate formulation of quantum mechanics like the single-mind the-
ory might allow for impressive empirical predictions and be heuristically useful yet
fail to provide a compelling account of experience. For strong adequacy it is not
enough that there be something on which the empirical content of one’s experience
might in principle be taken to supervene. One requires, rather, a formulation of
quantum mechanics that provides a compelling explanation of a situated observer’s
measurement records given our background commitments regarding how an ob-
server’s experience in fact supervenes on the physical world. Such a theory would
address the quantum measurement problem by providing a plausible explanation
of the physical records that explain our quantum experience.
A currently fashionable approach to getting an appropriately compelling account
of quantum experience is to insist that a satisfactory formulation of quantum me-
chanics admits of a primitive ontology of objects whose motions in three-dimensional
space explain our experience. The argument goes something like this.15 A funda-
mental physical theory is supposed to account for our experience of the physical
world. Since the physical world appears to be constituted by three-dimensional
macroscopic objects in motion, the theory should describe the world in terms of
a primitive ontology, objects that can be considered to be the fundamental build-
ing blocks of ordinary three-dimensional macroscopic objects. By describing how
these fundamental objects move, one explains the motions and properties of ordi-
nary macroscopic objects and hence provides a compelling account of experience.
The thought is that a theory provides a satisfactory explanation of our manifest
experience if and only if it puts the right objects in the right places at the right
times.
This approach seems to get something intuitively right. Neither the book-
universe example nor the single-mind theory provide a primitive ontology of objects
in motion that might be taken to be constitutive of the manifest physical world. The
book-universe theory describes a world whose physical structure is very different
from appearances. And the single-mind theory fails to provide anything physical
on which one’s experience might be taken to supervene. The tempting thought here
is that opting for a theory with a primitive ontology of three-dimensional objects
in motion allows one to return to a theory like classical mechanics where one has
something like a direct account of the manifest physical world of ordinary objects
doing ordinary things.
But this thought is poorly motivated. While classical mechanics is broadly com-
patible with our background assumptions regarding how we form reliable records
when we observe the world, and is hence arguably strongly adequate, at least in
the domain of classical phenomena, it is not because its primitive ontology of par-
ticles is somehow directly manifest. One does not see a table through unmediated
apprehension of the positions and motions of its constituent particles. Rather,
classical mechanics provides a context where one might tell a compelling story for
how a physically situated observer might end up with reliable records of the table’s
properties on observation. To be sure, the story involves a primitive ontology of
15The following description follows Allori’s (2013) line of argument. See Allori, Goldstein, Tu-
mulka, and Zanghi (2014) for more on how a primitive ontology is supposed to capture the manifest
image of the world.
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particles and fields in ordinary three-dimensional space, but that’s because the on-
tology of classical mechanics happens to be a primitive ontology, not because there
is anything canonical or special about such an ontology.
Similar considerations hold for explaining situated experience in Bohmian me-
chanics. While one can characterize the theory in such a way that it admits of a
primitive ontology (by appealing to three-dimensional particle positions rather than
the full particle configuration and by finding a suitable three-dimensional surrogate
for the wave function over configuration space), a situated observer would not have
any special epistemic access to the positions or motions of such objects by dint of
their being part of a primitive ontology. Indeed, as we will see, there is a concrete
sense in which a situated observer in Bohmian mechanics does not see particles or
configurations of particles at all.
So even if one describes Bohmian mechanics in terms of a primitive ontology,
the objects in the primitive ontology are not what a situated observer sees. Rather,
the empirical content of a situated observer’s physical records is determined by the
effective wave function selected by the full particle configuration.16 Since the ef-
fective wave function depends on the universal wave function and on the positions
of potentially distant particles, it is not at all well conceived of as a well-localized
object in motion in ordinary three-dimensional space, and hence is not a candidate
for an element of a primitive ontology. In this sense, how Bohmian mechanics ex-
plains the experience of a situated observer undermines the motivation for adopting
a primitive ontology in the first place.
To see how this works, we will consider how Bohmian mechanics explains the
measurement records, and hence the experience, of a physically situated observer
and the sense in which one might take the theory to be strongly adequate. The
story is much richer and more compelling than the one provided by the single-mind
theory, and perhaps significantly more subtle than one might expect. The theory’s
ontology plays a role in the account, but there is no special reason to take that
ontology to be primitive.
The first step is to get a sense of how the theory describes physical systems
generally.
16Dürr, Goldstein, and Zangh̀ı (1992) introduced the notion of an effective wave function to explain
how epistemic probabilities work in Bohmian mechanics. That one has, at most, epistemic access
to the effective wave function in Bohmian mechanics is a recurring theme in the literature. While
he was not ideally clear on the point, Bohm himself sometimes seems to have recognized this in
his initial presentation of the theory (1952, 374 and 383). As we will see, Bell also had a sense
of this. Later, Albert (1992, 156–60) and Valentini (1992, 33) explicitly showed that if one knew
the particle configuration in the context of an EPR set up with more precision than allowed by
the effective wave function, then it would allow one to send superluminal signals, violating the
predictions of quantum mechanics. That one does not have epistemic access to precise particle
positions in the theory also plays a key role in Brown and Wallace’s (2003) argument that Bohmian
mechanics has no advantages over Everettian quantum mechanics. We will also return to this point
later. The present argument is that, inasmuch as it determines the full empirical content of the
situated observer’s records, the effective wave function is what a situated observer most directly
sees. So while one might say that the theory’s primitive ontology explains one’s experience, if one
sets Bohmian mechanics up that way, it is only by dint of the role it plays in determining the
effective wave function. And there is no need for the ontology to be primitive to play this role.
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5. Bohmian mechanics
One might think of the single-mind theory as a hidden-variable formulation of
quantum mechanics where the always-determinate hidden variable is the mental
state of the observer. This choice of hidden variable provides a direct, but blatantly
ad hoc, account of one’s quantum experience. In contrast, the hidden-variable in
Bohmian mechanics is particle configuration, which provides a more subtle, indirect
account of experience. How plausible one ultimately finds the account will depend
on the background assumptions one brings to one’s evaluation of the theory.
Bohmian mechanics might be characterized by following rules:17
1. representation of states: The complete physical state of a system S at time t
is given by the wave function ψ(q, t) over configuration space and a point
in configuration space Q(t).
2. interpretation of states: The position of every particle is always determinate
and is given by the current configuration Q(t).
3I. linear dynamics: The wave function evolves in the standard unitary way.















where mk is the mass of particle k and Q(t) is the current configuration.
4. distribution postulate: The epistemic probability density of the configura-
tion Q(t0) is |ψ(q, t0)|2 at an initial time t0.18
Here both the wave function ψ(q, t) and the current particle configuration Q(t)
evolve in 3N -dimensional configuration space, where N is the number of particles
in the system S. One might think of the probability density |ψ(q, t)|2 as describing
a compressible probability fluid in configuration space. As John Bell put it
No one can understand this theory until he is willing to think of ψ
as a real objective field rather than just a ‘probability amplitude.’
Even though it propagates not in 3-space but in 3N -space. (1987,
128; emphasis in the original)
The wave function evolves deterministically according to the linear dynamics (rule
3I), and as the probability fluid flows about in configuration space, it carries the
point representing the particle configuration Q(t) along as described by the particle
dynamics (rule 3II). In brief, the particle configuration moves as if it were a massless
particle carried by the probability current in configuration space.
Under this dynamics, if the epistemic probability density for the particle configu-
ration is ever given by the standard epistemic quantum probabilities |ψ(q, t)|2, then
it will continue to be until one makes an observation. The distribution postulate
17This follows Bell’s (1987) formulation of Bohm’s (1952) theory.
18There is a long tradition of trying to weaken this assumption. For a notable example see Dürr,
Goldstein, and Zangh̀ı’s (1992) discussion of quantum equilibrium. While there is much to say
regarding the status of probability in Bohmian mechanics, here we set aside the question of whether
the distribution postulate can be replaced by something weaker and follow Bell’s formulation of the
theory. That said, Dürr, Goldstein, and Zangh̀ı’s notion of an effective wave function is essential
to the argument that follows.
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(rule 4) stipulates that one assign a prior epistemic probability density |ψ(q, t0)|2
to the particle configuration at time t0. As a result, Bohmian mechanics predicts
the standard quantum probabilities for particle configurations, and consequently,
it predicts the standard quantum distribution of particles, and hence the objects
they constitute, in ordinary three-dimensional space.
The upshot is that if it were ever possible for an observer to see the particles,
and hence precisely where they were, one would expect to find them statistically
distributed as predicted by quantum mechanics. It might thus seem trivial to
recover the standard quantum statistical predictions for the observation of particle
positions. While this is not how the theory explains our experience, even well-
informed proponents often talk this way.
Bell himself sometimes seems to have suggested that Bohmian mechanics ac-
counts for our experience of the motions of three-dimensions objects in ordinary
three-dimensional space in an entirely straightforward way:
The fundamental interpretative rule of the model is just that [the
value the particle position variable Q(t)] is the real position of
the particle at time t, and that observation of position will yield
this value. Thus the quantum statistics of position measurements
. . . [are] recovered immediately. But many other measurements re-
duce to measurements of position. For example, to ‘measure the
spin component σx’ the particle is allowed to pass through a Stern–
Gerlach magnet and we see whether it is deflected up or down, i.e.
we observe position at a subsequent time. Thus the quantum sta-
tistics of spin measurements are also reproduced, and so on. (1987,
34)
On this description, one might imagine that the theory explains experience because
we directly see where things are and find them to be distributed in the standard
quantum way. Since the theory predicts the standard quantum probabilities for
the positions of things, it makes the standard quantum predictions insofar as every
measurement is in fact ultimately a measurement of position. So, one might con-
clude, the theory’s primitive ontology of things with always-determinate positions
immediately explains our measurement records and corresponding experience.19
Bell also suggested that predicting the right “positions of things” might rea-
sonably be taken to be both a necessary and a sufficient condition for a theory
to provide a satisfactory account of experience. On this view, since we see things
move just as the theory predicts, Bohmian mechanics is empirically adequate. Put
another way, Bohmian mechanics is empirically adequate because it admits of a
primitive ontology of objects in motion in ordinary three-dimensional space and
puts the objects in the right places statistically at the right times.
But how Bohmian mechanics explains experience of a situated observer is sig-
nificantly more subtle and much less intuitive than this might suggest. It is not
empirically adequate because it describes a primitive ontology of directly observable
three-dimensional objects in motion; rather, it is empirically adequate because the
19Importantly, one might take what Bell says in this quotation to be strictly true and hold that
it just needs careful unpacking. Everything turns on what it means to say that we see whether
the electron is deflected up or down. This is the sort of unpacking that we will aim to do in the
next two sections.
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particle configuration together with the wave function provides an emergent struc-
ture, the effective wave function, on which the content of measurement records
might be taken to supervene. Hence, insofar as Bohmian mechanics might be taken
to be strongly adequate, it is not because it admits of a directly observable primitive
ontology but because the ontology, whether primitive or not, suffices to provide an
emergent structure that might serve as to explain experience.
6. a simple spin story in Bohmian mechanics
Always-determinate particle configuration plays a role in explaining determinate
measurement records and hence experience in Bohmian mechanics, but not by
directly representing the empirical content of those records. We will get at what it
means to see something in Bohmian mechanics and how one does so in two steps.
First, we will consider what the theory predicts regarding the motion of a particle
in an x-spin measuring device of the sort described by Bell. Then we will consider
how a situated observer might observe the position of that particle in the theory.
Each story requires us to track the evolution the wave function and the resultant
evolution of the particle configuration.
Consider the sort of x-spin measurement Bell describes. With only one particle,
we can tell an idealized version of the story in ordinary three-dimensional space.20














Figure 2. How x-spin up and x-spin down flavored wave packets move
inhomogeneous field associated with the Stern-Gerlach magnets (as in figure 2A):
|↑x〉e|0〉e → |↑x〉e|upx〉e.
And an x-spin down flavored wave packet would evolve like this (as in figure 2B):
|↓x〉e|0〉e → |↓x〉e|downx〉e.
If an electron is associated with one of these wave packets it would be carried along
by the probability current (as in figure 3).
20Among other idealizing assumptions, we will suppose that the wave function is spherically
symmetric with a uniform probability density. See Sebens (2020) for a more detailed account of
how the state of an electron evolves in the context of a Stern-Gerlach apparatus.







Figure 3. An x-spin up flavored wave packet guiding an electron
















Because of the symmetry in the probability currents produced by this evolution,
an electron that starts in the top half of the initial z-spin wave wave packet will
end up associated with the x-spin up wave packet (as in figure 4). And an electron
that starts in the bottom half of the initial z-spin wave wave packet will end up








Figure 4. An effectively z-spin up electron selecting an x-spin up
flavored wave packet
postulate (rule 4) the initial position of the electron can be thought of as being
randomly determined by the standard quantum probabilities, the probability of
the electron being deflected up and the probability of it being deflected down are
each 1/2 in this case. To measure the x-spin component of the electron, the particle
is allowed to pass through appropriately-aligned Stern-Gerlach magnets, then, as
Bell puts it, we see whether it is deflected up or down. Since it is equally likely
to be deflected up and down here, his suggestion is that the standard quantum
statistics are immediately reproduced in the present case.
More generally, the theory’s dynamical laws predict that if particles are ever
distributed according to the standard quantum statistics (and rule 4 says they are
at time t0), then they will always be so distributed.
21 Hence, if as suggested by
21See Barrett (2020) for a discussion of this point.
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the primitive-ontology approach, all one needs to do is to put objects in the right
positions at the right times to explain experience, then one might imagine that
Bohmian mechanics provides an immediate and direct account of our quantum
experience.
The problem is that none of this explains how a situated observer sees whether
the electron is deflected up or down. To be sure, if the distribution postulate
is satisfied, then the electron is in fact deflected up or down with the standard
quantum probabilities, but we have not said anything about how an observer, as
characterized by the theory, sees where the electron is. Being able to tell that part of
the story is essential to how Bohmian mechanics address the measurement problem.
Indeed, it is essential to how the theory manages to be empirically adequate at all.
Of central importance is that the situated observer never sees the electron itself.
If any observer were ever able to see an object, and hence where it is, she would
be able to use the theory’s deterministic dynamics to predict its motion with more
precision than the standard quantum statistics allow. To see why, suppose one could
directly see that the electron was in fact in the top half of the initial z-spin wave
packet. One would then know that it will be found to be x-spin up with probability 1
given the setup of the spin measurement apparatus. But the standard quantum
statistics require this probability to be 1/2. So, if one could do better than chance
in making this prediction, it would violate the standard predictions of quantum
mechanics, which have been repeatedly borne out by experience. The upshot is
that if one ever saw where any object was, this would immediately threaten the
empirical adequacy of Bohmian mechanics. So it better be that a situated observer
never directly sees where the electron is. The theory itself tell us why one never
does.22
Rather than providing objects in motion in three-dimensional space for us to
see, the empirical role of the particle configuration in Bohmian mechanics is to
select an effective wave function. In the simple spin experiment above, as the wave
function pushes the particle about, the particle’s position selects the effective wave
function to be either | ↑x〉e|upx〉e or | ↓x〉e|downx〉e. In figure 4, for example, the
effective wave function selected by the particle position is |↑x〉e|upx〉e. The effective
wave function is what determines the empirical content of a situated observer’s
measurement record. But to see how this works, we need to consider what the
situated observer is doing when she observes the position of the electron.
22More generally, since Bohmian mechanics is fully deterministic, if one ever knew the exact state
(the particle configuration, the wave function, and the Hamiltonian), one would be able to predict
precisely where the electron would be at all future times. It is also the case that if one ever knew
the configuration with better precision than allowed by the standard quantum statistics, then one
would always know it with better precision than allowed by the standard quantum probabilities.
This is why if one wants to drop the distribution postulate, one needs to adds something else
to the theory like a special standard of typicality as suggested by Dürr, Goldstein, and Zangh̀ı
(1992). Note that no matter how natural such a standard of typically may seem, just as with
the distribution postulate, it has real work to do in explaining why one cannot know more than
what is allowed by the standard quantum probabilities given that the theory is fully deterministic.
Important for present purposes, whatever one does to get the standard quantum probabilities in
Bohmian mechanics, one will not know the precise particle configuration by observation, or by
any other means, if there is any spread in the wave function as that would violate the standard
quantum probabilities.
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7. a situated observer in Bohmian mechanics
It is a manifest empirical virtue that Bohmian mechanics allows for a consistent
internal model of measurement in terms of a situated observer, a system that can
reliably record determinate measurement outcomes and whose behavior is itself
fully characterized by the theory. This is what makes the theory a compelling
response to the quantum measurement problem.
To say what it means for an observer to see an electron in Bohmian mechanics,
we need to say how it is that a situated observer, as described by the theory, might
reliably record the motion of an electron. To model a situated observer, we need to
characterize a physical system capable of producing determinate records given the
theory’s ontology. In brief, since positions are determinate, one gets determinate
records by correlating the position of one’s recording system with whatever one is
measuring of the object system.
We will consider a situated observer who measures position and records her result
in position in the context of a two-path experiment where we re-interfere the two
x-spin components of the wave function. We will begin by describing the object
system, then add a simple system to serve as the observer’s physical record.










Figure 5. A single-particle two-path experiment in three-
dimensional space
x-spin up wave packet would evolve as follows:
|↑x〉e|0〉e → |↑x〉e|A〉e → |↑x〉e|0′〉e
and if an x-spin down wave packet would evolve as follows:
|↓x〉e|0〉e → |↓x〉e|B〉e → |↓x〉e|0′〉e
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The upshot is that an electron that began in the top half of an initial z-spin










Figure 6. The same setup with an electron that gets pushed along
path A
particle, one can imagine the electron as being pushed along by the probability
current evolving in ordinary three-dimensional space. Importantly, note that while
the electron is effectively x-spin up when it is on path A, it is effectively z-spin up
again when it gets to region 0′. This is because the two x-spin wave packets overlap
again in three-dimensional space reproducing the original z-spin up flavored packet
which then determines the dispositional properties of the electron.
We will add a recording particle p to the composite system to serve as the situated
observer’s physical record. Suppose that the situated observer records the position
of electron e in the position of particle p by correlating p’s position with e’s position
as represented in figure 7. Here the interaction between e and p is arranged so that
the recording particle p shifts from position a to position b if and only if the electron
e travels path B. The position of the recording particle p will select the record of
the situated observer.
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The specified interaction between e and p means that an initially z-spin up wave





























Since the composite system consists of two particles, the dynamics describes the
wave function is evolving in 3N -dimensional configuration space (since N = 2, this
is a 6-dimensional space) with the probability current pushing the single point that
simultaneously represents the two particles.
If the electron begins in the top half of the initial wave packet, then the two-
particle system evolves as indicated in figure 7 in ordinary three-dimensional space.













Figure 7. Situated observation of position in three-dimensional
space producing an x-spin (path A) up record
along by probability currents as indicated in figure 8. Here the resultant particle
configuration selects the |↑x〉e-flavored wave packet as the effective wave function.
Note that while the two x-spin wave packets end up in the same region of three-
dimensional space at 0′, they do not overlap in configuration space. Hence the
configuration remains associated with the x-spin-up flavored wave packet which
now serves as the effective wave function.
If the electron begins in the bottom half of the initial wave packet, then the

































Figure 8. Situated observation of position in configuration space













Figure 9. Situated observation of position in three-dimensional
space producing an x-spin down (path B) record
space. And the single point representing the positions of each of the particles is
pushed along by probability currents as indicated in figure 10. Here the resultant
particle configuration selects the |↓x〉e-flavored wave packet as the effective wave
function. And again, while the two x-spin wave packets end up in the same region
of three-dimensional space, they do not overlap in configuration space. In this case,
the configuration remains associated with the x-spin-down flavored wave packet
which now serves as the effective wave function.
In each case, the two-particle configuration selects an effective wave function
that reliably records the path taken by e. It also reliably records that the electron
ends up effectively x-spin up in the first case and effectively x-spin down in the
second. Because of the displacement generated by the position correlation between
e and p, the two x-spin wave packets do not overlap in configuration space, so the
measurement record selected by the two-particle configuration ensures that e will
exhibit the same effective x-spin even if one repeats the first measurement when
it is in the interference region 0′. The situated observer’s record, then, both acts

































Figure 10. Situated observation of position in configuration space
producing an x-spin down (path B) record
as a reliable record and causes the electron to behave as if it had an intrinsic,
fully-determinate x-spin.23
Importantly, the situated observer does not now directly see the position of p
any more than she directly sees the position of e. Rather, her physical record, and
hence her experience, are simply determined by the effective wave function selected
by the two-particle configuration.
It is in this way that the effective wave function determines both the empirical
content of one’s record and the subsequent dispositional properties of one’s object
system. This can be seen concretely in the two cases above. The empirical content
of the record in the first case (figure 8) is that the |↑x〉e-flavored wave packet is
the effective wave function for the two particles. This makes e effectively x-spin
up. The empirical content of the record in the second case (figure 10) is that the
|↓x〉e-flavored wave packet is the effective wave function for the two particles. This
makes e effectively x-spin down. And the situated observer’s knowledge of the
electron’s position is precisely what the standard quantum statistics allow for this
setup given her knowledge of how her apparatus works. In this sense, her position
measurement and the imprecise information she gains from it are optimal.
The moral is simply that the empirical content of a measurement record in
Bohmian mechanics is bounded by the effective wave function selected by the par-
ticle configuration. This is the most that a situated observer can have epistemic
access to given her record. And, in this sense, it is also what she most directly sees
when she looks for the electron.24 While a reliable measurement record allows one
to infer something about the electron’s position, it does not tell one where it is.
Again, it is essential to the empirical adequacy of the theory that one can never see
where any object is in any sense that allows one to know more than what can be
23See Barrett (2000) and (2020, 208–214) for detailed discussions of Bohmian surreal trajectories
in this sort of two-path experiment.
24One might be tempted to say that the content of the situated observer’s record is the approx-
imate position of the electron. But it is more than that. The precisely sort of approximation is
given by the shape of the effective wave function. And that the observer knows what the effective
wave function is explains her ability to predict what will happen on subsequent spin measure-
ments. Such is the argument that it is the effective wave function that determines the empirical
content of her experience.
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inferred from the effective wave function. If one could, one would be able to make
empirical predictions that violate the standard quantum probabilities.
It is because the determinate particle configuration satisfies the standard quan-
tum statistics that the effective wave function it selects does too. So by specify-
ing something determinate, the particle configuration, Bohmian mechanics provides
something on which our quantum experience might be taken to supervene, the effec-
tive wave function selected by the particle configuration. And since this something
exhibits the standard quantum statistics and satisfies the standard quantum prob-
abilities, the theory is at least weakly adequate. The extent to which one takes
it to be strongly adequate depends on how plausible one finds the claim that our
experience in fact supervenes on effective-wave function records.
The upshot is that inasmuch as the content of one’s experience supervenes on
something to which one might epistemic access, the experience of a situated observe
can supervene on nothing more informative than the effective wave function selected
by the determinate particle configuration if the distribution postulate is satisfied.
And if the situated observer’s does supervene on the effective wave function, the
theory explains why she can have precisely the limited epistemic access to the
positions of things described by the standard quantum statistics.25
As both turn on the fact that particle configurations are not directly observable
in Bohmian mechanics, the present argument is closely related to an argument that
Harvey Brown and David Wallace (2003) offer against the theory. The difference
in the two arguments is instructive.
In brief, Brown and Wallace argue that since one does not have epistemic access
to particle configuration in Bohmian mechanics, one is left with just the unitarily
evolving wave function to explain one’s experience, and hence one is no better off
than in Everettian quantum mechanics. To be sure, on the sort of Everettian ac-
count they have in mind, the wave function, under plausible physical conditions,
will exhibit the structure of decohering branches, each of which might be taken to
represent a different measurement record for a physically situated observer in that
each branch provides something, at least in principle, on which the observer’s expe-
rience might be taken to supervene.26 Significantly, unlike in Bohmian mechanics,
there is no particle configuration to select a single post-measurement branch or ef-
fective wave function. But Brown and Wallace do not take it to be a problem that
Everettian quantum mechanics fails to select a single post-measurement branch as
physically privileged. In brief, they hold Everett’s position that a situated observer
would never notice that there was in fact more than one measurement outcome.27
Hence, on their view, Bohmian mechanics is Everettian quantum mechanics but
with a superfluous particle configuration that can serve no legitimate explanatory
25One can formulate versions of Bohmian mechanics where observables other than position are
selected as determinate. See Bell (1987, 173–180) and Vink (1993), (2018), and (2020) for examples
of how to do so. On such formulations, the value of the hidden-variable selects an effective wave
function, but depending on the sequence of interactions, it will typically not be the same sort of
effective wave that would have been selected by particle configuration.
26There is good reason here to find Maudlin’s (2010) argument against Brown and Wallace that
the wave function alone cannot possibly explain experience unconvincing. All one needs for such
an explanation is a suitable target for experiential supervenience. And insofar as classical field
configurations might serve as a suitable target, so might the wave function with decoherence
considerations. More on Maudlin’s argument below.
27See Barrett (2020, 141–87) for an extended discussion of how this is supposed to work for both
Everett and more recent Everettian approaches.
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purpose since particle positions are never in fact observable. As a consequence,
Bohmian mechanics loses to Everettian quantum mechanics on grounds of relative
parsimony.
In contrast, the present argument is that since one does not have epistemic access
to particle positions in Bohmian mechanics, one cannot take a situated observer’s
experience to supervene directly on objects in motion in three-dimensional space
and hence there is nothing special in opting for a primitive ontology. That said,
contrary to what Brown and Wallace argue, the theory does provides something
more than a set of mutually incompatible decoherent substructures as a possible
target of supervenience. Namely, inasmuch as it reflects precisely the limits of one’s
epistemic access, one might take a situated observer’s experience to supervene on
the effective wave function selected by the post-measurement particle configura-
tion. And insofar as one takes the effective wave function to be a suitable target
for experiential supervenience, Bohmian mechanics is a good candidate for strong
adequacy.
It matters that Bohmian mechanics provides a potential target for supervenience
not found in Everettian quantum mechanics. Indeed, if one wants to explain stan-
dard forward-looking quantum probabilities, the probabilities one assigns to the
outcomes before performing a measurement, this is pure explanatory gold. Inas-
much as every physically possible measurement record is fully realized in Everettian
quantum mechanics, there is a straightforward sense in which the forward-looking
probability one assigns to each possible outcome before performing the measure-
ment is simply one. But in Bohmian mechanics, each possible record is predicted
with the standard forward-looking quantum probabilities as epistemic probabilities.
And precisely one of these possible records is selected by the particle configuration
as it determines the effective wave function. Further, while the observer does not
know where in the effective wave packet her test particle is, she can nevertheless un-
derstand her forward-looking probabilities as probabilities for approximately where
the particle will be and her physical record as an approximate record of its actual
current position.28 Indeed, the precise sense in which the record is approximate
is given by the effective wave function. This goes hand-in-hand with the effective
wave function’s role as the structure on which the empirical content of the observer’s
record supervenes. She may use this rough-hewn content to predict subsequent par-
ticle motions and hence infer forward-looking epistemic probabilities for the results
of future measurements.
So Bohmian mechanics provides explanations of a sort that one cannot get in
Everettian quantum mechanics. That said, these explanations do not work the way
that the Bohmian primitive ontologist might have initially imagined. In particu-
lar, they require one to take the effective wave function as a suitable target for
supervenience.
There is another closely-related argument that may be helpful. Tim Maudlin
(2010) argues that one of the virtues of Bohmian mechanics is that it provides
something physical, namely the positions of particles, that quantum probabilities
are probabilities for (2010, 122–4, 130, 136). But just having determinate configu-
rations for physical objects is not enough. Maudlin also argues that they must also
28Note that this is true even in the context of surreal trajectories. What one cannot do is use
one’s classical intuitions to infer what the particle’s trajectories were. See Barrett (2020, 208–214)
for a discussion of surreal trajectories in Bohmian mechanics.
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be visible. Namely, we should want a physical theory that allows us to say, at least
schematically, how people who look at physical objects like measurement pointers
can reliably tell where they are. And, he believes, Bohmian mechanics allows one
to do precisely this (2010, 122).
The right reply here depends in part on how one understands Maudlin’s italicized
visible. As we have seen, if one sets things up right, Bohmian mechanics allows one
to infer approximate particle configurations from one’s measurement records. So
if that is what it means to be visible, then one might take Maudlin’s line to mesh
well with the present argument. Indeed, we have seen in some detail how one
might infer the approximate position of an electron by determining the effective
wave function associated with the electron and a recording particle. But again,
this sort of explanation only works if one takes the effective wave function to be
a suitable target for supervenience of a situated observer’s experience, and it is
unclear whether that meshes well with Maudlin’s account.
Importantly, one need not solve the mind-body problem or provide a detailed
prescription for how to fill the logical gap between the derivable consequences of
one’s physical theory and sense experience in order to judge Bohmian mechanics
to be strongly adequate.29 But one does need commitments regarding how ex-
perience supervenes on physical states that goes well beyond a vague sense that
our experience is best explained in terms of the manifest motions of objects in
three-dimensional space.
Two last points regarding primitive ontology. First, inasmuch as the effective
wave function is an emergent entity determined by the universal wave function
and the positions of all the relevant particles given the precise details of the sit-
uated observer’s measurement interaction, it is not at all well conceived of as a
three-dimensional object and is hence decidedly not part of the theory’s primitive
ontology. Second, since one never directly observes the particle positions that select
the effective wave function, there can be no good empirical reason for taking parti-
cles with always-determinate positions in three-dimensional space to be a required
part of the theory’s ontology. In particular, there is no empirical reason not to
embrace some variety of configuration-space realism and take one’s basic ontology
to be the wave function and the total particle configuration. Either way, each ul-
timately provides the same something, the effective wave function, on which one’s
experience might be taken to supervene.30
8. situated empirical adequacy
We have considered what it might mean for a formulation of quantum mechan-
ics to be empirically adequate and have seen how the notion of a situated observer
allows one to distinguish between weaker and stronger varieties of empirical ade-
quacy. The general moral is that one should want a physical theory that supports
a plausible sort of situated empirical adequacy whenever one can get it.
A theory that is minimally adequate just provides a predictive algorithm that
makes the right empirical predictions. A weakly adequate theory makes the right
empirical predictions for a situated observer as characterized by the theory. And
a theory is more strongly adequate the better it allows one to account for a situ-
ated observer’s experience given our beliefs and commitments regarding how our
29See Maudlin (2010, 141) for this sort of worry.
30See Albert (2013) for a characterization of this sort of wave function realism.
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experience in fact supervenes on the state of the world. The suggestion is that one
should not settle for anything less than a strongly adequate formulation of quantum
mechanics as a resolution to the measurement problem.
For a formulation of quantum mechanics to be strongly adequate, one needs
something determinate that provides something on which the content of a situated
observer’s determinate measurement outcomes might plausibly supervene. In the
case of Bohmian mechanics the something is the particle configuration and uni-
versal wave function and the something is the effective wave function selected by
the particle configuration, the emergent structure that explains the existence and
empirical content of a situated observer’s records.
As we have seen, Bohmian mechanics is not empirically adequate because it
admits of a primitive ontology of objects in motion then puts the objects in the
right places at the right times in order that their manifest positions might be directly
apprehended. Rather, it is empirically adequate because it predicts the records in
terms of the effective wave function for a physically situated observer. And the
story one tells about how this works is arguably just as compelling whether one
tries to tell it in three-dimensional space or in configuration space as we have here.
In either case, the effective wave function is an emergent structure on which one’s
experience might be taken to supervene.
The empirical content of a situated observer’s experience is given by the effective
wave function selected by the particle configuration. This is what her record records
and hence what she most directly sees. It is what she has epistemic access to. As
a result, Bohmian mechanics should be judge strongly adequate precisely insofar
as one takes the effective wave function to be a suitable target for experiential
supervenience.
Bohmian mechanics provides a consistent, rich, and compelling internal account
of how an observer ends up with determinate effective wave function records. And it
explains why a situated observer should expect her records to exhibit the standard
quantum statistics and why she should assign the standard forward-looking quan-
tum probabilities as credences for future measurement records. That it predicts
the right effective wave functions for situated observers is what makes it a seri-
ous contender for providing a satisfactory resolution to the quantum measurement
problem.31
31I would like to thank Craig Callender, Jeroen Vink, Chip Sebens, Thomas Barrett, and the
editor and two anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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